In this paper we explore game-theoretic reasoning in dynamic games within the framework of belief revision theory. More precisely, we focus on the forward induction concept of "common strong belief in rationality"(Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002)) and the backward induction concept of "common belief in future rationality" (Perea (2012)) and Baltag, Smets and Zvesper (2009)) and see whether the belief revision policies involved in these two concepts can be represented by plausibility orderings. We …nd that belief revision in "common strong belief in rationality" can always be represented by suitably chosen plausibility orderings, whereas this is impossible in some games for "common belief in future rationality".
Introduction
Belief revision plays a fundamental role in human decision making, and determines to a large extent the choices we make. Indeed, the beliefs we hold today may be contradicted by new evidence tomorrow, and at that point in time we must be prepared to change our beliefs as to accommodate the new piece of information. The choices we make tomorrow will therefore crucially depend upon how we revise these beliefs.
So, in order to understand how people make decisions in a dynamic environment we must …rst investigate how they may revise their beliefs upon observing new facts. Of course there are many di¤erent ways of changing beliefs, and in order to develop a meaningful theory of belief revision we must present a list of desirable properties that a belief revision process should satisfy. In the eighties, Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson (1985) presented one such list of properties -known today as the AGM-axioms -that would have a fundamental impact on the development of belief revision theory. The class of belief revision policies satisfying the AGM-axioms still serves as a central model of belief change in many works in various di¤erent areas.
Some years later, Grove (1988) proved a beautiful characterization result which states that the belief revision policies satisfying the AGM-axioms are precisely those that can be derived from some plausibility ordering over states of the world. By the latter we mean that the decision maker ranks all possible states of the world in terms of their (subjective) plausibility, and upon receiving a new piece of information restricts his new belief to the most plausible states that are compatible with the new information. This plausibility ordering not only determines the decision maker's initial belief -namely the set of states he deems most plausible overall -but also how the decision maker changes his belief in case the new information completely -or partially -contradicts his initial belief. In this case, the decision maker restricts his attention to a smaller set of states -namely those that are not ruled out by the new information -and among these states he selects those that he …nds most plausible. This will then serve as his new, revised belief. In my view, plausibility orderings provide a very natural way of inducing a belief revision policy, and Grove's representation theorem con…rms that the AGM-axioms indeed establish an intuitive list of postulates, leading to a natural class of belief revision rules.
Belief revision is of special importance in dynamic games, where players may learn new facts about the past behavior of their opponents during the game. In such cases, players may need to revise their beliefs about the opponents'strategy choices, and the eventual choices made by the players will crucially depend on how they revise these beliefs. As an illustration, consider the dynamic game in Figure 1 .
For player 2 it seems reasonable to initially believe -before anything has happened -that player 1 will choose b and end the game immediately. To see this, note that for player 2 it is irrational to choose g. Hence, if player 1 believes that player 2 would choose rationally upon choosing a, then player 1 expects not to get more than 2 by choosing a, and therefore would rather choose b.
But what would player 2 do in this game? If it is player 2's turn to make a move, he knows that player 1 has chosen a, and not b, so player 2 has to revise his initial belief We will describe two plausible belief revision scenarios for player 2 in this game, leading to two di¤erent choices.
In the …rst scenario, player 2 believes that choosing a was a conscious, optimal choice for player 1. In that case, however, player 2 must believe that player 1 will subsequently choose d, as this is the only way for player 1 to obtain more than 3 -the utility he could have guaranteed by choosing b at the beginning. So, player 2 will respond by choosing f . Note that in this scenario, player 2, upon observing a, can no longer believe that player 1 believes that player 2 will choose rationally after a. Namely, in order to rationalize player 1's move a, player 2 must believe that player 1 ascribes a high probability to player 2 making the irrational choice g, as only then player 1 can achieve more than 3 by choosing a. This belief revision scenario corresponds to the forward induction concept of "common strong belief in rationality" as developed by Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) , and which is based upon the "extensive-form rationalizability procedure" by Pearce (1984) . The main idea in this concept is that a player, when he observes an unexpected move by his opponent, tries to interpret this move as being part of an optimal strategy, whenever this is possible. This is precisely what player 2 does in the game of Figure 1 under the belief revision scenario described above, when he observes the unexpected move a by player 1. He interprets a as being part of an optimal strategy by player 1, but then he must believe that player 1 will choose the follow-up action d, and hence player 2 will choose f himself. This is not the only plausible way for player 2 of revising his belief, however. If he observes that player 1 has -surprisingly -chosen a, he could also believe that this was a mistake by player 1, but that player 1 will still choose rationally in the game that lies ahead, and that player 1 still believes that player 2 will choose rationally in the remainder of the game. In that case, player 2 will believe that player 1 believes that player 2 will not choose g. Hence, player 2 will believe that player 1 chooses c after a -and not d as in the belief revision scenario above. As a consequence, player 2 will respond by choosing e -and not f as in the scenario above. This second belief revision scenario is implicit in the backward induction concept of "common belief in future rationality"as proposed by Perea (2012) and Baltag, Smets and Zvesper (2009) . The key condition in this concept is that a player, upon observing an unexpected move by his opponent, always believes that the opponent will choose rationally from now on, and that the opponent believes that the other players will also choose rationally from now on, and so forth. However -and that is the main di¤erence with "common strong belief in rationality" -the player need not believe that the opponent's past choice was an optimal choice, even when believing so is possible. In fact, the player is free to believe that the unexpected move he observed was actually a mistake by the opponent. Important is that the player believes that from now on everything is back to normal -that is, that the opponent will choose rationally from now on, and that the opponent believes that everybody else will choose rationally from now on, and so forth. In this sense the concept is entirely forward looking, as it only imposes conditions on how players reason about current and future moves, and not about past moves. That is why we call it a backward induction concept, as opposed to forward induction reasoning which requires players to also reason critically about opponents'past moves.
We thus see that the forward induction concept of "common strong belief in rationality"and the backward induction concept of "common belief in future rationality"do not only describe di¤erent belief revision scenarios for player 2 in the game above, but also lead to di¤erent choices for player 2. This shows that belief revision crucially matters for how players choose in a dynamic game.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the game-theoretic concepts of "common strong belief in rationality"and "common belief in future rationality"within the realm of belief revision theory. More particularly, we analyze whether the belief revision processes implicit in these two concepts conform to the AGM-axioms or not. In that sense, we are building a bridge between game-theoretic reasoning on the one hand, and belief revision theory on the other. So far, this relationship has not been extensively explored in the literature -some exceptions being the works by Bonanno (2009 Bonanno ( , 2011 Bonanno ( , 2012 ) and Baltag, Smets and Zvesper (2009).
We …nd that the belief revision policies in "common strong belief in rationality" do conform to the AGM-axioms, whereas the belief revision policies in "common belief in future rationality"do not. To prove this, we show in Section 6 that for every player in a dynamic game, we can always …nd a suitable plausibility ordering over the relevant states of the world that induces precisely the belief revision policy implicit in "common strong belief in rationality". By Grove's representation theorem, we conclude that these belief revision policies will thus conform to the AGM-axioms.
On the other hand, we show in Section 7 that there are games for which we can …nd no plausibility ordering that induces the belief revision policy given by "common belief in future rationality". As such, the belief revision that is involved in "common belief in future rationality" must violate some of the AGM-axioms. We also point at a particular AGM-axiom that is violated by this concept, namely the "preservation axiom". This axiom states, roughly speaking, that one should not include new beliefs in the belief set as long as the information received is still consistent with the old belief set. So it re ‡ects a kind of minimal belief change that is present in "common strong belief in rationality", but not in "common belief in future rationality". In Section 7 we explain, by means of an example, why "common belief in future rationality"violates this property.
At the end of this paper we focus on the special class of games with perfect information, in which players move one at the time, and always observe precisely what his opponents have done so far. We show by means of a counterexample that even in such games, "common belief in future rationality" cannot be characterized by plausibility orderings. However, we show that the concept can be re…ned to a stronger concept, "common belief in rationality at future and parallel information sets", which can be characterized by plausibility orderings for this special class of games, provided there are no relevant ties in the game. Moreover, the latter concept, like "common belief in future rationality", always induces the backward induction strategies in such games.
For the class of games with perfect information, Baltag, Smets and Zvesper (2009) have de…ned the concept of "common knowledge of stable belief in dynamic rationality", which has exactly the same spirit as "common belief in future rationality", and show that it also uniquely yields the backward induction strategies in case there are no relevant ties. One di¤erence with "common belief in future rationality"is that their concept assumes, from the beginning, that the players'belief revision policies are given by plausibility orderings. So, in that sense the concept is similar to "common belief in rationality at future and parallel information sets" which is also characterized by plausibility orderings in perfect information games without relevant ties, and also uniquely leads to the backward induction strategies there. These insights show that for perfect information games, backward induction can be characterized by suitably chosen plausibility orderings.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give a formal de…nition of a dynamic game and its associated strategies. In Section 3 we introduce hierarchies of conditional beliefs in dynamic games, and show how these can be encoded by means of an epistemic model with types. It is also shown how belief revision can be captured within this model. In Section 4 we give a de…nition of a "reasoning concept"for dynamic games, describing the possible belief hierarchies that a player can hold for any such game. The concepts of "common strong belief in rationality" and "common belief in future rationality" are special cases of a "reasoning concept". In Section 5 we introduce plausibility orderings in dynamic games, and de…ne what it means for a reasoning concept to be characterized by a pro…le of plausibility orderings. In Section 6 we formally introduce the concept of "common strong belief in rationality" and show that it can always be characterized by a suitably chosen pro…le of plausibility orderings. In Section 7 we formally de…ne the concept of "common belief in future rationality" and demonstrate that it cannot always be characterized by plausibility orderings. In that section we also show that this concept violates the "preservation axiom"-one of the AGM axioms. In Section 8 we investigate the class of games with perfect information, as discussed above. We end with some concluding remarks in Section 9.
Dynamic Games

A Model of Dynamic Games
In a dynamic game, players may have to choose more than once during the course of the game, and may partially or completely observe what other players have done in the past when it is their time to make a choice. Throughout this paper we assume that the dynamic game is …nite -that is, the game ends after …nitely many moves, and every player has …nitely many choices available at every moment in time where it is his turn to move. Formally, a …nite dynamic game G consists of the following ingredients.
There is a …nite set of players I: The instances where one or more players must make a choice are given by a …nite set X of non-terminal histories. The possible instances where the game ends are described by a …nite set Z of terminal histories. By ; we denote the beginning of the game.
Consider a non-terminal history x where it is player i's turn to move. As player i may not fully observe what his opponents have done in the past, player i may not be able to distinguish x from other non-terminal histories. Formally, we model player i's information at x by an information set h that contains all non-terminal histories that, from player i's point of view, are indistinguishable from x: We denote by H i the collection of all information sets for player i in the game. We assume that there is perfect recall, meaning that a player never forgets what he previously did, and what he previously knew about the opponents'past choices.
Consider a non-terminal history x at which player i must make a choice. By C i (x) we denote the …nite set of choices that are available to player i at x: Let h 2 H i be the information set for player i to which x belongs. As on the one hand, player i cannot distinguish x from other non-terminal histories in h; but on the other hand is assumed to know the set of choices available to him, we must require that C i (y) = C i (x) for all non-terminal histories y 2 h: But then, we may as well use the notation C i (h); specifying the (unique) set of choices available to player i at information set h 2 H i .
We explicitly allow for simultaneous moves in the dynamic game. That is, we allow for non-terminal histories at which several players make a choice. Formally, this means that for some non-terminal histories x there may be di¤erent players i and j; and information sets h 2 H i and h 0 2 H j ; such that x 2 h and x 2 h 0 : In this case, we say that the information sets h and h 0 are simultaneous. For instance, in the game of Figure 1 we see that players 1 and 2 simultaneously move at information set h 1 :
Consider a non-terminal history x where I(x) is the set of active players. That is, I(x) contains those players who must make a choice at x: Then, every combination of choices (c i ) i2I(x) is assumed to move the game from the non-terminal history x to some other (terminal or non-terminal) history y: These transitions can formally be described by a move-function m, which assigns to every non-terminal history x; and every combination of choices (c i ) i2I(x) ; the (terminal or non-terminal) history m(x) that follows.
We say that history y follows some other history x if y can be reached from x by a suitable sequence of choice combinations, given the move-function m: Similarly, we say that an information set h follows some other information set h 0 if there are histories x 2 h and y 2 h 0 such that x follows y: We say that information set h weakly follows h 0 if either h follows h 0 ; or h and h 0 are simultaneous. We assume, throughout this paper, that there is an unambiguous ordering of the information sets in the game. That is, if information set h follows information set h 0 ; then h 0 does not follow h: Or, equivalently, there cannot be histories x; y 2 h; and histories x 0 ; y 0 2 h 0 such that x follows x 0 ; and y 0 follows y: Players are assumed to have preferences over the possible outcomes in the game, representable by utility functions over the set of terminal histories Z. Formally, for every terminal history z 2 Z and player i; we denote by u i (z) the utility for player i at z; representing how desirable he deems the outcome z:
Strategies
Intuitively, a strategy for a player is a complete plan which describes what he will, or would, do in every situation that could possibly arise in the game. By de…nition, the possible situations in the game where player i must make a choice are exactly the information sets in H i : So, a possible de…nition of a strategy for player i -and this is in fact the traditional de…nition of a strategy in game theory -would be a function that assigns an available choice to each of player i's information sets. The problem with this de…nition, however, is that it may contain some redundant information, as certain future information sets of player i can be excluded by choices at earlier information sets of player i: In that case, it is no longer relevant to specify what this player would do at those excluded future information sets, as those information sets will certainly not be reached if the player implements the strategy correctly -as we suppose him to do. Consider, for instance, the game in Figure 1 . If player 1 decides to go for b at the beginning of the game, he is certain that his future information set h 1 will not be reached. So in that case it is redundant to specify what player 1 would do were h 1 to be reached, as h 1 is clearly avoided by the choice b: We may therefore view b as a complete plan, although b is not a strategy in the traditional sense. In fact, we will accept b as a full description of a strategy for player 1.
An argument that is often used in defense of the traditional de…nition of a strategy is that the choices speci…ed at precluded information sets re ‡ect the opponents'counterfactual beliefs about his future behavior if the player decides to deviate from his plan. See Rubinstein (1991) for a discussion of this issue. But this would mean that the strategy represents both choices and beliefs -something I consider highly undesirable. In my opinion, we should always clearly separate objects of choice from beliefs, and to put them in the same object is likely to cause confusion. After all, the term strategy suggests that it re ‡ects only the plan of choices of a player. The beliefs of the players will anyhow be modelled separately in the next section, so there is no need to mix them with the players' choices.
Having said this, we opt for a de…nition of a strategy that only prescribes choices at those information sets not precluded by earlier choices. To de…ne this formally, consider two information sets h and h 0 for player i; and an available choice c 2 C i (h) at h: We say that choice c avoids information set h 0 if for every non-terminal history x 2 h; choosing c at x can never lead to a non-terminal history in h 0 :
De…nition 2.1 (Strategy) A strategy for player i is a function s i : Let us denote by S i the set of all strategies for player i: Since the dynamic game G is …nite, the set S i will be …nite as well. By S := i2I S i we denote the set of all strategy combinations, and for every player i we denote by S i := j2Infig S j the set of strategy combinations for i's opponents. For a given information set h 2 H i ; let S(h) be the set of strategy combinations that reach h -that is, the set of strategy combinations (s j ) j2I that reach some history in h if every player j carries out his strategy s j : By S i (h) we denote the set of strategies s i for player i for which there is some opponents'strategy combination s i 2 S i such that (s i ; s i ) 2 S(h): We say that strategies in S i (h) possibly reach h: Similarly, S i (h) denotes the set of strategy combinations s i 2 S i for which there is some strategy s i 2 S i such that (s i ; s i ) 2 S(h): We say that strategy combinations in S i (h) possibly reach h:
Consider some information set h 2 H i for player i: As we assume that the game G has perfect recall, player i remembers at h each of his past choices, and hence h is preceded by a unique sequence of past choices for player i: So, S i (h) contains precisely those strategies that prescribe this unique sequence of player i choices preceding h: But then, it is not di¢ cult to see that
Modelling Belief Hierarchies
We now wish to model the players' beliefs in a dynamic game. There are at least two complications that we face here.
First, when players reason about their opponents in a dynamic games, they do not only hold beliefs about what other players do (…rst-order beliefs), but also hold secondorder beliefs about the opponents'…rst-order beliefs about what others do, and third-order beliefs about the opponents'second-order beliefs, and so on. So, players hold a full in…nite belief hierarchy.
Secondly, a player in a dynamic game may have to revise his belief if the game moves from one of his information sets to another. That is, a player will hold at each of his information sets a new conditional belief about the opponents which is compatible with the event that this particular information set has been reached. Consider, namely, some player i who observes that his information set h 2 H i has been reached. Then he knows that his opponents' must be implementing some combination of strategies in S i (h) -the set of opponents'strategy combinations that make reaching h possible -and hence player i must at h restrict his belief to opponents'strategy combinations in S i (h): And this conditional belief may be -partially or completely -contradicted at some later information set, in which case he must change his belief there.
Consider, for instance, the game in Figure 1 , and suppose that player 2 initially believes that player 1 chooses b: Then, if player 2 is required to make a choice at h 1 ; he knows that player 1 has chosen a; and hence his previous belief was wrong. Player 2 must therefore substitute it by a new conditional belief at h 1 that only considers strategies for player 1 that are still possible -namely (a; c) and (a; d):
Summarizing, we see that we need to model conditional belief hierarchies for a player, which specify at each of his information sets what he believes about the opponents'strategy choices, the opponents' …rst-order beliefs, the opponents' second-order beliefs, and so on. But how can we model such complicated objects? One way to do so is by using a Harsanyi-style model with types (Harsanyi (1967 (Harsanyi ( -1968 ) and adapt it to dynamic games. To see how this works, consider a player i who at information set h 2 H i holds a belief about the opponents'strategies, the opponents'…rst-order beliefs, the opponents' second-order beliefs, and so on. In other words, this player holds at h a belief about the opponents'strategies and the opponents'conditional belief hierarchies. So, a conditional belief hierarchy for player i speci…es at each of i's information sets a conditional belief about the opponents'strategy choices and the opponents'conditional belief hierarchies. If we substitute the word "belief hierarchy"by the word "type"-as Harsanyi did -then we obtain the following de…nition.
(a) T i is a set of types for player i;
(b) b i is a function that assigns to every type t i 2 T i ; and every information set h 2
Recall that S i (h) represents the set of opponents'strategy combinations that possibly reach h: By T i := j2Ifjg T j we denote the set of opponents'type combinations. For every …nite set X; we denote by (X) the set of probability distributions on X: Clearly, player i must at h only assign positive probability to opponents'strategy combinations in S i (h); as these are the only strategy combinations compatible with the event of reach h:
Note that in part (b) we require player i to hold a conditional belief also at ; -the beginning of the game -even when player i is not active there. Hence, we assume that every player holds an initial belief before the start of the game. This assumption is not essential for what we do, but it makes the exposition easier.
From now on, we will use the notation H i := H i [ f;g. So, at every information set h 2 H i type t i holds a conditional probabilistic belief b i (t i ; h) about the opponents' strategies and types. In particular, type t i holds conditional beliefs about the opponents' strategies. As every opponent's type holds conditional beliefs about the other players' strategies, every type t i holds at every h 2 H i also a conditional belief about the opponents'conditional beliefs about the other players'strategy choices. And so on. Since a type may hold di¤erent beliefs at di¤erent histories, a type may, during the game, revise his belief about the opponents'strategies, but also about the opponents'conditional beliefs. In fact, for a given type t i within an epistemic model, we can derive the complete belief hierarchy it induces.
Reasoning Concepts
A reasoning concept imposes restrictions on the way a player reasons about his opponents in a dynamic game. Remember from the previous section that we have summarized the reasoning of a player by a conditional belief hierarchy, which describes at each of his information sets what he believes about the opponents'strategy choices, the opponents' …rst-order beliefs, the opponents' second order beliefs, and so on. In turn, such belief hierarchies have been modelled by epistemic models with types, which may be seen as an easy way to encode such in…nite belief hierarchies.
But if this is true, then we could attempt to formalize a reasoning concept as follows: Take an arbitrary dynamic game G and an epistemic model M: Then, a reasoning concept selects for a given player a subset of types within M; representing those belief hierarchies that are "allowed for"by the reasoning concept. Although this may seem reasonable there is one major problem with this attempt, namely that the epistemic model at hand may not contain all belief hierarchies that we are interested in -some belief hierarchies that we would wish to select are simply not present in the epistemic model. In order to avoid this problem we assume the epistemic model to be belief complete 1 (cf. Brandenburger (2003)). 
That is, for every possible conditional belief vector that we can construct within our model there is a type that has precisely this belief vector. It is not at all obvious that such models will always exist. Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999) , however, have shown that for every …nite dynamic game, we can always construct a belief complete epistemic model which assumes (common belief in) Bayesian updating. A similar construction can be employed to build a belief complete epistemic model without Bayesian updating, as we use here.
Hence, if we work with a belief complete epistemic model, then we are sure not to miss out on any conditional belief vector we could possibly have constructed within our model. With this de…nition at hand, we can now de…ne a reasoning concept as a mapping that selects a subset of belief hierarchies within a belief complete epistemic model.
De…nition 4.2 (Reasoning concept)
A reasoning concept is a mapping that assigns to every …nite dynamic game G; every belief complete epistemic model M = (T i ; b i ) i2I for G; and every player i 2 I; some subset i (G; M ) T i of types.
So, e¤ectively, a reasoning concept selects for every dynamic game a set of belief hierarchies for every player -those belief hierarchies that are deemed "most plausible"by this reasoning concept.
Plausibility Orderings
Plausibility orderings are a very natural way to generate, or characterize, belief revision policies by agents. Consider an agent whose space of uncertainty is given by a set X of possible states of the world. Now suppose that, before receiving any new information, this agent ranks the possible states in X according to a plausibility ordering. That is, for every pair of states x and y; the agent speci…es which of these two states he deems more plausible, if any. If the agent subsequently receives new information revealing that the true state must be in E X; then it makes intuitive sense for the agent to concentrate his conditional belief only on states in E that he deems "most plausible".
This approach plays an important role both in belief revision theory and counterfactual logic. Grove (1988) has shown that the belief revision policies that follow the AGM axioms are exactly those that can be characterized by plausibility orderings over states. So, in a sense, the AGM axioms for belief revision are logically equivalent to the use of plausibility orderings. In his paper, Grove uses systems of spheres instead of plausibility orderings, but we will see below that both approaches are equivalent. Lewis (1973) and Stalnaker (1968) , on the other hand, use plausibility orderings to evaluate counterfactual statements. More precisely, they assume for every state x a plausibility ordering over states that deems x; and only x; as most plausible. According to the Lewis-Stalnaker theory, a conditional statement "if p then q"is true at that state x if q is true at all "most plausible p-states". By the latter, we mean states at which p is true, and which are most plausible amongst the states at which p is true. Unlike Lewis, Stalnaker assumes that there is always a unique most plausible p-state, but apart from this the two approaches are basically equivalent.
An important di¤erence between the Grove-model and the Lewis-Stalnaker model is that Grove assumes just one global plausibility ordering, whereas Lewis and Stalnaker consider a local plausibility ordering for every state x:
Plausibility orderings can also naturally be applied to the study of belief revision in dynamic games. As we have seen in the previous section, a reasoning concept selects at every information set a set of possible conditional beliefs that a player can hold, and hence represents a particular belief revision policy for each of the players. A natural question that arises is whether these belief revision policies can be characterized by some plausibility ordering. That is precisely the question we will focus on in this paper, and we investigate this question for two existing reasoning concepts in the literature, namely common strong belief in rationality (Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002)) and common belief in future rationality (Perea (2012), Baltag, Smets and Zvesper (2009)). In order to properly analyze this question we must …rst formally introduce a plausibility ordering, and de…ne what it means for a reasoning concept to be characterized by a plausibility ordering.
In a dynamic game, a player holds at each of his information sets some conditional belief about the opponents'strategies and belief hierarchies. In the previous section we have seen that the players'belief hierarchies can be encoded by means of types within a epistemic model M = (T i ; b i ) i2I : Moreover, M is guaranteed to capture, for every player i; all possible conditional belief vectors on S i T i if we require M to be belief complete. So, if we take a belief complete epistemic model M = (T i ; b i ) i2I ; then the space of uncertainty for player i is given by S i T i -the set of all opponents'strategy-type combinations. Consequently, a plausibility ordering for player i is an ordering over the set S i T i : De…nition 5.1 (Plausibility ordering) Consider a dynamic game G and a belief complete epistemic model M = (T i ; b i ) for G: Then, a plausibility ordering for player i is a binary relation < i on S i T i that is (a) total, i.e. for every two strategy-type combinations x and y in S i T i either x < i y or y < i x; (b) re ‡exive, i.e. x < i x for every x 2 S i T i ; and (c) transitive, i.e. x < i z whenever there is some y with x < i y and y < i z:
The meaning of x < i y is that player i deems the opponents'strategy-type combination x at least as plausible as y: Consider now a player i who holds a plausibility ordering < i on S i T i ; and who observes that his information set h has been reached. Then, player i knows that the opponents' strategy-type combination must be somewhere in S i (h) T i ; as S i (h) contains precisely those opponents' strategy combinations that make reaching h possible. If player i's belief revision policy is governed by his plausibility ordering < i ; then player i should concentrate his conditional belief at h on those strategytype combinations in S i (h) T i that he deems most plausible. That is, player i must concentrate his conditional belief on the set
But for this conditional belief to be well-de…ned, we must require that the set max < i (S i (h) T i ) is non-empty. So, we must require that at each of player i's information sets, there is at least one most plausible strategy-type combination in S i (h) T i : This condition is not automatically satis…ed as the set T i is in…nite -in fact uncountably in…nite -whenever the epistemic model is belief complete and the game is non-trivial. A plausibility ordering that satis…es this additional requirement is called well-ordered.
For a given well-ordered plausibility ordering < i ; consider for every x 2 S i T i the set
Then, the collection of sets fsphere x j x 2 S i T i g is nested, that is, either sphere x sphere y or sphere y sphere x for all x; y: Moreover, the well-ordering condition guarantees that for every information set h 2 H i there is a smallest sphere in the collection that intersects S i (h) T i : Hence, the collection fsphere x j x 2 S i T i g corresponds to a system of spheres as in Grove (1988) . The other direction is also true: If we start from a Grovean system of spheres on S i T i ; then this naturally induces a well-ordered plausibility ordering on S i T i : We may therefore interchangeably speak about well-ordered plausibility orderings and systems of spheres -both ways of modelling are equivalent. Now, what does it mean precisely that a reasoning concept is characterized by a combination of plausibility orderings -one for each player? Intuitively, this would mean that at every information set for player i; the set of opponents'strategy-type combinations deemed possible by at h coincides precisely with the most plausible strategy-type combinations that make reaching h possible. But what exactly are the opponents'strategy-type combinations deemed possible by at h? Consider, for a given dynamic game G and belief complete epistemic model M; a type t i 2 i (G; M ) for player i selected by the reasoning concept : Remember that b i (t i ; h) is the conditional probabilistic belief that t i holds at h about the opponents'strategy-type combinations in S i T i : We can thus say that type t i ; at information set h; deems possible the set supp(b i (t i ; h)) S i T i of opponents' strategy-type combinations, where supp(b i (t i ; h)) denotes the support of the probability distribution b i (t i ; h): Overall, the reasoning concept will therefore, at information set h; deem possible the set [
of opponents'strategy-type combinations. Indeed, this set contains precisely those strategytype combinations that are deemed possible at h by at least one type selected by the reasoning concept : Hence, to say that the reasoning concept is characterized by a pro…le of plausibility orderings means that for every information set h; the set above coincides exactly with the set of most plausible strategy-type combinations that make reaching h possible.
De…nition 5.3 (Reasoning concepts and plausibility orderings) Take a dynamic game G and a belief complete epistemic model M = (T i ; b i ) i2I for G: Take, for every player i; a well-ordered plausibility ordering < i on S i T i : A reasoning concept is characterized at (G; M ) by the pro…le (< i ) i2I of plausibility orderings if for every player i and every information set h 2 H i ; [
In terms of sphere systems, the above de…nition states that at every information set h the reasoning concept looks for the smallest sphere A that intersects S i (h) T i ; and concentrates at h on the intersection of S i (h) T i with A: This is graphically represented in Figure 2 , where A is the sphere with the thick border. In the remainder of this paper we will investigate whether -and if so, how -the reasoning concepts of "common strong belief in rationality" and "common belief in future rationality" can be characterized by plausibility orderings.
Common Strong Belief in Rationality 6.1 De…nition
The concept of "common strong belief in rationality"has been developed by Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) . They have shown that the strategies that can rationally be chosen by players who reason in accordance with this concept correspond precisely tho the extensive form rationalizable strategies as de…ned by Pearce (1984) and Battigalli (1997) . The main idea behind "common strong belief in rationality" is that a player must believe in the opponents' rationality whenever this is possible. More precisely, if player i …nds himself at information set h; and concludes that h could be reached if his opponents choose rationally, then player i must believe at h that his opponents choose rationally. We say that player i strongly believes in the opponents'rationality. Moreover, if h could be reached if his opponents choose rationally, then player i asks as second question, namely whether h could still be reached if his opponents do not only choose rationally but also strongly believe in their opponents'rationality. If the answer is yes, then player i must believe at h that his opponents choose rationally and strongly believe in their opponents' rationality. By iterating this argument, we arrive at "common strong belief in rationality". To formalize this notion, let us …rst de…ne what we mean by rationality and strong belief. Consider a type t i for player i; an information set h 2 H i and a strategy s i that possibly reaches h: By u i (s i ; b i (t i ; h)) we denote the expected utility that player i gets if the game is at h; player i chooses s i there, and holds the conditional belief b i (t i ; h) about the opponents' strategy-type combinations. Note that this expected utility does not depend on the full conditional belief that t i holds at h; but only on the conditional belief about the opponents'strategy choices. In words, a strategy is rational for a type if at every relevant information set it yields the highest expected utility, given the conditional belief held by the type at that information set. We next de…ne the notion of strong belief.
De…nition 6.2 (Strong belief
That is, at every information set h where the event E is consistent with the event of h being reached, player i must concentrate his belief fully on E: The concept of "common strong belief in rationality"can now be de…ned as follows. (2002) show that the sets of types T 1 i are always non-empty for every …nite dynamic game, and that the strategies which are optimal for a type in T 1 i are precisely the extensive form rationalizable strategies as de…ned in Pearce (1984) and Battigalli (1997) . By construction, the sets of types T k i are monotonically shrinking in k; that is, T for every k; where means strict set inclusion 2 . However, the intersection of all these sets -which is T 1 i -will always be non-empty.
Characterization Result
We will now prove that the concept of "common strong belief in rationality" can be characterized by plausibility orderings, and show how such plausibility orderings can be de…ned. 
Then, < i is a well-ordered plausibility ordering for every player i; and "common strong belief in rationality" is characterized at (G; M ) by the pro…le (< i ) i2I of plausibility orderings.
Proof. Fix a player i. We …rst show that the binary relation < i de…ned above is total, re ‡exive, transitive and well-ordered. To prove so, it will be helpful to introduce some additional objects.
Let R For every element x 2 S i T i ; de…ne the number k(
By de…nition of < i we have that
for all x; y 2 S i T i : But then, it is immediately clear that < i is total, re ‡exive and transitive. It remains to show that < i is well-ordered. Consider some information set h 2 H i : De…ne the number
We …rst show that the number k(h) is well-de…ned. For every opponent j 6 = i and every k 2 Knf 1g; let S k j := fs j 2 S j j s j rational for some t j 2 T k j g:
is the set of opponents'strategy combinations present in R k i : As the dynamic game G is …nite, the set S i of opponents' strategy-combinations is …nite as well. But then, there must be some k 2 Knf 1; 1g such that
Now, to show that the number k(h) is well-de…ned we distinguish two cases. Suppose …rst that R
is empty as well. But then, there must be some k < k such that R
By de…nition of < i we have at information set h 2 H i that
which is guaranteed to be non-empty. We may therefore conclude that < i is well-ordered. We now show that at every information set h 2 H i ; [
which together with (1) would imply that "common strong belief in rationality" is characterized by < i for player i:
is nonempty. Also, by de…nition of "common strong belief in rationality", T 1 i contains precisely those types t i 2 T i that strongly believe each of the events R k i ; k 2 f0; 1; :::g: But then, the conditional beliefs that types in T 1 i can hold at h are precisely those conditional beliefs that assign probability 1 to R
Hence, (2) must hold. Together with (1), we conclude that "common strong belief in rationality"is characterized at (G; M ) by < i for player i: This holds for every player i; and hence the proof is complete.
As the proof of the theorem above shows, the concept of "common strong belief in rationality"can alternatively be characterized by the Grovean system of spheres
for every player i; where we set R 1 i := S i T i : That is, player i will look at every information set h 2 H i for the smallest sphere R k i that intersects S i (h) T i ; and will concentrate his conditional belief at h on the intersection between S i (h) T i and this smallest sphere R k i : This is graphically represented in Figure 3 . In this picture, we have taken R 1 i to be the smallest sphere that intersects S i (h) T i :
Common Belief in Future Rationality
De…nition
The concept of "common belief in future rationality"has been de…ned in Perea (2012) , and is very similar to the notion of "common knowledge of stable belief in dynamic rationality" by Baltag, Smets and Zvesper (2009). The main di¤erence between the two is that the latter notion restricts to dynamic games with perfect information whereas the …rst is Figure 3 : Characterization of "common strong belief in rationality"by Grovean system of spheres applicable to all …nite dynamic games. The key idea is that a player must always believe, at every stage of the game, that his opponents will choose rationally in the game that lies ahead. We say that this player believes in his opponents' future rationality. Baltag, Smets and Zvesper (2009) refer to this condition as "stable belief in dynamic rationality". Not only this, a player must also always believe that his opponents always believe in their opponents'future rationality, and so on. This eventually leads to the concept of "common belief in future rationality". This concept is completely forward looking, as a player need not necessarily believe that his opponents have chosen rationally in the past even when believing so is possible. At the same time, a player must always hold on to the belief that his opponents will choose rationally in the future even when it is evident that these same opponents have chosen irrationally in the past. So, in a sense, it requires a degree of "stubbornness" by the players that is not present in "common strong belief in rationality". To formally de…ne the concept, we …rst state precisely what we mean by "belief in future rationality".
For a given strategy s i for player i; let H i (s i ) denote the collection of information sets for player i that are possibly reached by s i : Consider a belief complete epistemic model M = (T i ; b i ) i2I for the dynamic game G at hand. For every information set h in the game, let
Remember that h 0 weakly follows h if either h 0 follows h; or h 0 and h are simultaneous. Hence, R i [h] contains those strategy-type pairs where the strategy is optimal for the type "from h onwards". De…nition 7.1 (Belief in future rationality) A type t i believes in his opponents'future rationality if at every information set h 2 H i ; the conditional belief b i (t i ; h) assigns probability 1 to the event
Here,
So, no matter what has happened in the game so far, type t i will always at every information set h assign probability 1 to the event that his opponents will choose rationally from h onwards. With this de…nition at hand, we can now formally introduce "common belief in future rationality". has been de…ned for all players i: Then,
Common belief in future rationality selects for every player i the set of types T
Hence, a type in T k i always believes that every opponent j holds a type in T is always non-empty for every …nite dynamic game. Moreover, both Perea (2012) and Baltag, Smets and Zvesper (2009) show that in every dynamic game with perfect information without relevant ties, the strategies selected by the concept are precisely the backward induction strategies.
Impossibility Result
We show that the reasoning concept of "common belief in future rationality" can not always be characterized by plausibility orderings.
Theorem 7.3 (Impossibility result)
There is a game G and a belief complete epistemic model M = (T i ; b i ) i2I for G; such that the concept of "common belief in future rationality"cannot be characterized at (G; M ) by any pro…le (< i ) i2I of well-ordered plausibility orderings.
Proof. Consider the game G in Figure 4 , which is known as "Battle-of-the-sexes-withoutside-option" and constitutes one of the classical forward induction examples in the literature. Take an arbitrary belief complete epistemic model M = (T i ; b i ) i2I : We …rst show that there must be a type t 2 2 T 2 for player 2 that expresses "common belief in future rationality", and which initially believes that player 1 chooses (a; c): Namely, as the model M is belief complete, there must be types t 1 2 T 1 and t 2 2 T 2 with the following conditional beliefs:
Here, b 1 (t 1 ; ;) = (e; t 2 ) means that type t 1 ascribes at ; probability 1 to the event that player 2 chooses strategy e while being of type t 2 : Similarly for the other three beliefs.
It can easily be veri…ed that both types t 1 and t 2 believe in the opponent's future rationality. Consider, for instance, the type t 2 : That type believes at ; that player 1 chooses (a; c) and that player 1 is of type t 1 : As type t 1 believes, at ; and h 1 ; that player Figure 4 : A game in which "common belief in future rationality"cannot be characterized by plausibility orderings 2 chooses e; strategy (a; c) is optimal for t 1 at ; and h 1 : Hence, type t 2 believes at ; that player 1 chooses optimally at ; and h 1 ; so t 2 believes at ; in 1's future rationality. Similarly, it can be checked that the same type t 2 believes at h 1 that player 1 chooses optimally at h 1 : Therefore, t 2 believes in 1's future rationality overall. In the same way it can be checked that also type t 1 believes in his opponent's future rationality. As t 1 believes throughout the game that player 2's type is t 2 ; and t 2 believes throughout the game that player 1's type is t 1 ; it immediately follows that both t 1 and t 2 express "common belief in future rationality". In particular, t 2 2 T 2 is a type that expresses "common belief in future rationality", and which initially believes that player 1 chooses (a; c):
On the other hand, (a; d) can never be an optimal strategy for player 1 at the beginning, as choosing b always yields him a strictly better outcome. So, under "common belief in future rationality", player 2 cannot initially ascribe positive probability to player 1 choosing (a; d): Consequently, there is no type t 2 2 T 2 that expresses "common belief in future rationality" and that initially assigns positive probability to player 1 choosing (a; d):
Now suppose, contrary to what we want to show, that the concept of "common belief in future rationality" is characterized at (G; M ) by a pro…le (< i ) i2I of well-ordered plausibility orderings. Then, in particular, [
2 is the set of player 2 types in T 2 that express "common belief in future rationality". Obviously, S 1 (;) = S 1 ; so we have that [
As the type t 2 above is in T 1 2 ; and b 2 (t 2 ; ;) = ((a; c); t 1 ); it follows that ((a; c); t 1 ) 2 [
Together with (3) we may thus conclude that
On the other hand, we have seen that there is no t 2 2 T 1 2 that initially assigns positive probability to player 1 choosing (a; d): Hence,
which, together with (3), implies that
Note that S 1 (h 1 ) = f(a; c); (a; d)g: By (4) and (5) it then follows that
Since we assume that the concept of "common belief in future rationality"is characterized by the pro…le of plausibility orderings (< i ) i2I ; we must have that [
Together with (6) we may thus conclude that
We will now show, however, that there is somet 2 2 T 1 2 which at h 1 assigns probability 1 to player 1 choosing (a; d); contradicting (7).
As the model M is belief complete, there must be typest 1 2 T 1 andt 2 2 T 2 with the following conditional beliefs:
Note that typet 2 revises his belief about player 1's strategy choice during the game: at the beginning,t 2 believes that player 1 chooses b; whereas at h 1 typet 2 believes that player 1 chooses (a; d):
It may be veri…ed that both typest 1 andt 2 believe in the opponent's future rationality. Consider, for instance, the typet 2 ; which believes at ; that player 1 chooses b while being of typet 1 : As typet 1 believes at ; that player 2 chooses f; strategy b is optimal for typê t 1 at ;: Hence,t 2 believes at ; that player 1 chooses rationally at ;: Strategy b for player 1 makes reaching h 1 impossible, so we conclude that typet 2 believes at ; in 1's future rationality. At h 1 ; the same typet 2 believes that player 1 chooses (a; d) while being of typet 1 : As typet 1 believes at h 1 that player 2 chooses f; strategy (a; d) is optimal for typet 1 at h 1 : Indeed, among the two strategies for player 1 that reach h 1 -which are (a; c) and (a; d) -strategy (a; d) is optimal under the belief that player 2 chooses f: So, typet 2 believes at h 1 that player 1 chooses rationally at h 1 : Overall, we may conclude that typet 2 believes at ; and h 1 in 1's future rationality. That is,t 2 believes in 1's future rationality. Note, however, thatt 2 believes at h 1 that player 1 has chosen irrationally in the past, as b is better than (a; d) fort 1 at the beginning. This is not a problem, as "common belief in future rationality" only requires players to believe in the opponents' future rationality, not necessarily in the opponents'past rationality.
In a similar fashion, it may be veri…ed that also typet 1 believes in his opponent's future rationality. Ast 1 believes throughout that player 2 is of typet 2 ; andt 2 believes throughout that player 1 is of typet 1 ; it follows that botht 1 andt 2 express "common belief in future rationality". In particular, we have found a typet 2 2 T 1 2 which at h 1 assigns probability 1 to player 1 choosing (a; d): This, however, contradicts (7). We are therefore led to conclude that the concept of "common belief in future rationality"cannot be characterized at (G; M ) by well-ordered plausibility orderings.
So, in a nutshell, the reason why "common belief in future rationality"cannot be characterized by plausibility orderings in the game of Figure 4 is as follows. Under "common belief in future rationality", player 1 can rationally choose (a; c) but not (a; d): Therefore, player 2 may initially deem (a; c) possible but not (a; d): If player 2's conditional beliefs were governed by a plausibility ordering, then player 2 would de…nitely deem (a; c) more plausible than (a; d): But then, upon reaching h 1 ; player 2 must necessarily conclude that player 1 did not choose (a; d); which is not true since under "common belief in future rationality"player 2 can believe at h 1 that player 1 chooses (a; d):
AGM Axioms
In the previous subsection we have seen that the concept of "common belief in future rationality"cannot be characterized by plausibility orderings in some games. As we have already discussed above, Grove (1988) has shown that the belief revision policies characterized by plausibility orderings are precisely those that satisfy the AGM axioms. So this suggests that the belief revision policy implicit in "common belief in future rationality" must violate at least one of the AGM axioms.
In order to make this statement explicit, we must model the players' belief revision policies in "common belief in future rationality"formally within an AGM-style framework. Semantically, a belief revision policy within the AGM framework can be described as follows. Take a set X of states of the world. An initial belief corresponds to a set B X; the set of states you deem possible initially. A piece of information also corresponds to a set of states, and will be denoted by E: So E X represents the information that the true state must be somewhere in E: By B E X we then denote the revised belief after receiving the new information E: So, formally speaking, a belief revision policy for an initial belief B is a mapping that assigns to every piece E of new information some revised belief B E: Of course, the revised belief must always be compatible with the new information you receive, and hence we require that B E E for every piece of information E:
Now, consider a dynamic game G and a belief complete epistemic model M = (T i ; b i ) i2I for G: Fix a player i: Then, from player i's perspective the set of states of the world is given by X := S i T i -the set containing all strategy choices and belief hierarchies that his opponents can possibly hold. As above, let us denote by T 1 i the set of types for player i that express "common belief in future rationality". These are the types we are interested in here. A natural way to de…ne player i's initial belief is therefore
Indeed, if we use this de…nition then B contains precisely those opponents'strategy-type combinations that receive positive probability at the beginning of the game by at least one type that expresses "common belief in future rationality". In other words, B contains all states that may be deemed possible initially if player i reasons in accordance with "common belief in future rationality" -exactly what we would expect from an initial belief.
One important di¤erence between belief revision in games and belief revision in the AGM framework is that in games the possible pieces of incoming information are limited. Namely, the only relevant pieces of information that player i receives during the game are those informing player i that one of his information sets h 2 H i has been reached. In that case, player i knows that his opponents have chosen a strategy combination from S i (h): So, formally, this piece of information corresponds to the subset S i (h) T i X: We denote this piece of information by [h] -that is, we de…ne
Player i's belief revision policy induced by "common belief in future rationality"can thus formally be described by a mapping that assigns to every piece of information [h]; where h 2 H i ; the revised belief
It may be viewed as a restricted belief revision policy, as a revised belief is not de…ned for every possible piece of new information E S i (h) T i ; but only for those pieces of information E that correspond to the event of reaching one of player i's information sets h 2 H i : So, what we have shown in the previous subsection is that this restricted belief revision policy induced by "common belief in future rationality"cannot always be characterized by a plausibility ordering on S i T i : In particular, cannot be extended to a full belief revision policy -one that gives a revised belief for every possible piece of information in S i T i -which can be characterized by a plausibility ordering. By Grove's theorem (Grove (1988) ), the full belief revision policies that can be characterized by a plausibility ordering are precisely those that satisfy all the AGM axioms. Therefore, we conclude that the restricted belief revision policy induced by "common belief in future rationality" cannot be extended to a full belief revision policy that satis…es the AGM axioms. This suggests that the restricted belief revision policy induced by "common belief in future rationality"must violate at least one of the AGM axioms. Which one?
It turns out that things go wrong for the following AGM axiom, which is often referred to as the preservation axiom. So, as long as the incoming information is consistent with the initial belief, the revised belief should only concentrate on states that you initially deemed possible. Hence, no new states should enter the picture in those situations.
It can easily be shown that the restricted belief revision policy induced by "common belief in future rationality" violates the preservation axiom. Consider the game G in Figure 4 , take some arbitrary belief complete epistemic model M = (T i ; b i ) i2I for G; and let be the restricted belief revision policy for player 2 induced by "common belief in future rationality". Then, the initial belief B is given by
We have seen in the proof of Theorem 7.3 that under "common belief in future rationality", player 2 may initially deem possible the strategy (a; c); but not the strategy (a; d); for player 1. That is,
From (8) it thus follows that
In the same proof, we have seen that there is somet 2 2 T 1 2 which at h 1 assigns positive probability to strategy (a; d): Consequently,
contains at least one strategy-type pair ((a; d); t 1 ) which, by (9) , is not in B: So, we conclude that
However, since B \ [h 1 ] 6 = ; by (10) , this means that the restricted belief revision policy violates the preservation axiom.
Intuitively, what is happening is that under "common belief in future rationality", player 2 may initially assign positive probability to player 1 choosing (a; c) or b: Hence, if player 2 …nds out that his information set h 1 is reached, then this new information is still consistent with his initial belief, and therefore the preservation axiom states that player 2 should not add new beliefs to his set. In spite of this, "common belief in future rationality" allows player 2 to add a new belief at h 1 ; namely that player 1 could be playing strategy (a; d): This, clearly, clashes with the preservation axiom.
Games with Perfect Information
A dynamic game is said to be with perfect information if di¤erent players never choose simultaneously, and every player, when making a choice, always knows exactly what the other players have done so far. Formally this means that at every non-terminal history exactly one player is active, and every information set consists of precisely one nonterminal history. We say that the game is without relevant ties (see Battigalli (1997) ) if for every player i; every information set h 2 H i ; and every two di¤erent terminal histories z; z 0 following h; it holds that u i (z) 6 = u i (z 0 ): Hence, two di¤erent choices for player i always lead to di¤erent utilities for that player.
It is well-known that in every perfect information game without relevant ties, the backward induction procedure yields a unique choice c bi (h) at every information set h: We will refer to these choices as the backward induction choices in the game. The backward induction strategy for player i is the unique strategy s (2012) it is shown that in every perfect information game without relevant ties, the concept of "common belief in future rationality" uniquely selects the backward induction strategy for every player. Indeed, in such games there is only one strategy that a player can rationally choose if his belief hierarchy expresses "common belief in future rationality", namely his backward induction strategy.
However, even for such games the concept of "common belief in future rationality"may not be characterizable by plausibility orderings, as the game in Figure 5 shows. Clearly, under "common belief in future rationality", player 2 must believe at ; that player 1 believes at ; that (a) player 2 will choose c and (b) player 3 will choose e: Also, player 2 must believe at ; that player 1 chooses rationally at ; and that player 3 chooses rationally at h 3 : As such, player 2 must believe at ; that player 1 will choose a and player 3 would choose c at h 3 : If player 2's belief revision process were to be induced by a plausibility ordering, then player 2 should still believe at h 2 that player 1 has chosen a and that player 3 would have chosen e at h 3 : However, under "common belief in future rationality", player 2 is free to believe at h 2 that player 3 would have chosen f , as player 3's information set h 3 does not follow h 2 : Hence, in this game with perfect information, "common belief in future rationality"cannot be characterized by plausibility orderings.
At the same time, the example in Figure 5 shows that "common belief in future rationality" is perhaps a bit too permissive. Indeed, there is no good reason why player 2 at h 2 should suddenly drop his belief that player 3 would choose rationally at h 3 : This leads to the question whether we can strengthen the concept of "common belief in future rationality" such that the new, more restrictive concept can be characterized by plausibility orderings in perfect information games without relevant ties. We will see that Instead of only requiring a player to believe that his opponents will choose rationally at future information sets, let us look at a stronger condition which states that at any point in time, a player also believes that his opponents would have chosen rationally at information sets that have been avoided by past choices. We call such information sets parallel information sets. For instance, in Figure 5 the information set h 3 is parallel to information set h 2 as it is avoided by the past choice a that leads to h 2 : A more formal way of stating it is to say that an information set h 0 is parallel to another information set h if h 0 does not weakly precede, nor weakly follow, h: The condition above, that a player always believes that his opponents will choose rationally in the future, and would have chosen rationally at parallel information sets, can formally be stated as follows. Consider a dynamic G -not necessarily with perfect information -and a belief complete epistemic model M = (T i ; b i ) i2I for G: For every player i; and every information set h in G; de…ne the event Here,R i [h] := j2InfigRj [h]: With this basic condition at hand, the concept of "common belief in rationality at future and parallel information sets" can then be de…ned in the obvious way. has been de…ned for all players i: Then,
Common belief in rationality at future and parallel information sets selects for every player i the set of types T
It can be shown that the sets of types T 1 i that express "common belief in rationality at future and parallel information sets"will always be non-empty, and will always be included in the sets of types that express "common belief in future rationality". However, the two concepts are "behaviorally equivalent" as they always select the same sets of strategies for every player. The reason is that for player i's choice at information set h it is only relevant what player i believes about the opponents'past and future choices, not what he believes about the opponents'possible behavior at parallel information sets. Clearly, the two concepts above impose no conditions on player i's belief about his opponents'past choices, and impose exactly the same conditions on his belief about the opponents'future choices. As such, it does not matter for player i's choice at information set h whether his beliefs are restricted by "common belief in rationality at future and parallel information sets"or only by "common belief in future rationality". Therefore, the two concepts only di¤er in the restrictions they impose on the players' conditional beliefs, but not in the strategy choices they select for the players. The formal proofs for the insights above are not di¢ cult, and we leave these to the reader for the sake of brevity.
As discussed above, the concept of "common belief in future rationality" uniquely …lters the backward induction strategies for every perfect information game without relevant ties. It then immediately follows that also "common belief in rationality at future and parallel information sets"uniquely selects the backward induction strategies in such games, as it is behaviorally equivalent to "common belief in future rationality". We can actually say a little more: Under "common belief in rationality at future and parallel information sets", there will be a unique belief for every player i at each of his information sets h 2 H i about the opponents'strategy choices, namely that his opponents will choose the backward induction choices at all future and parallel information sets. This is not true for "common belief in future rationality". In the game of Figure 5 , for instance, player 2 may believe at h 2 under "common belief in future rationality"that player 3 would choose f at h 3 ; although f is not the backward induction choice at h 3 :
Formally speaking, for a given player i and information set h in the game, let s It can be shown that under "common belief in rationality at future and parallel information sets", a type for player i must at every h 2 H i assign probability 1 to the strategy pro…le s bi i [h] by the opponents. Also this proof is not di¤ucult, and is left to the reader. Hence, every player i holds a unique vector bi i of conditional beliefs about the opponents' strategy choices. But then, every player i must believe throughout the game that every opponent j holds the belief vector bi j ; and must believe throughout that every opponent j believes throughout that every other player k holds the conditional belief vector bi k ; and so on. Clearly, this leads to the conclusion that under "common belief in rationality at future and parallel information sets", the full belief hierarchy of every player is uniquely determined. That is, the set T 1 i of types expressing "common belief in rationality at future and parallel information sets"is a singleton. Let us denote by t bi i the unique type for player i that expresses "common belief in rationality at future and parallel information sets". Then, at every information set h 2 H i the conditional belief of type t bi i about the opponents'strategy-type combinations is given by
That is, at h 2 H i type t bi i assigns probability 1 to the event that every opponent j chooses the backward induction strategy s bi j [h] conditional on h while being of type t bj j : This insight will be important for proving the following result, which states for perfect information games without relevant ties, the concept of "common belief in rationality at future and parallel information sets"can be characterized by plausibility orderings. Then, < i is a well-ordered plausibility ordering for every player i; and "common belief in rationality at future and parallel information sets" is characterized at (G; M ) by the pro…le (< i ) i2I of plausibility orderings.
Proof. Let M = (T i ; b i ) i2I be a belief complete epistemic model for G: First of all, it can easily be veri…ed that the binary relation < i de…ned above is a well-ordered plausibility ordering. We leave this to the reader. Now, let be the reasoning concept of "common belief in rationality at future and parallel information sets". As we have seen above, there is for every player i a unique type t 
for every player i and every h 2 H i : So, in order to prove that is characterized by the plausibility orderings above, we must show that
for every player i and every h 2 H i : Fix a player i and some information set h 2 H i : As, by construction, s (13) . This, in turn, implies (12) . Hence, we conclude that the reasoning concept of "common belief in rationality at future and parallel information sets"is characterized by the pro…le (< i ) i2I of plausibility orderings. This completes the proof.
The theorem above cannot be extended to general dynamic games, however. Consider for instance the game in Figure 4 . For that game, the concept of "common belief in rationality at future and parallel information sets" is fully equivalent -also in terms of beliefs -to "common belief in future rationality"as there are no parallel information sets in that game. Hence, even the concept of "common belief in rationality at future and parallel information sets"cannot be characterized by plausibility orderings in that game.
The theorem above shows, in particular, that for perfect information games without relevant ties we can always …nd a reasoning concept that (a) uniquely selects the backward induction strategy for every player, and (b) can be characterized by plausibility orderings. In that respect, the result is very similar to Baltag, Smets and Zvesper (2009). These authors, namely, assume from the beginning that the conditional beliefs of the players are characterized by plausibility orderings. Based on this assumption they then derive the notion of "common knowledge of stable belief in dynamic rationality", which is very similar to "common belief in future rationality", but now with the additional as-sumption that conditional beliefs are derived from plausibility orderings. In Corollary 4.5 they then prove that the concept of "common knowledge of stable belief in dynamic rationality" uniquely yields the backward induction strategies in every perfect information game without relevant ties. So also Baltag, Smets and Zvesper (2009) present a reasoning concept that is characterized by plausibility orderings and that uniquely returns the backward induction strategies in perfect information games without relevant ties.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have shown that the belief revision policies in "common strong belief in rationality"conform to the AGM-axioms, whereas the belief revision policies in "common belief in future rationality" do not. This raises the question whether "common belief in future rationality"corresponds to some di¤erent set of axioms in belief revision theoryfor instance the axioms for belief update in Katsuno and Mendelzon (1991) . The main di¤erence between belief update and the AGM-approach is that the latter models belief revision about a "static world" whereas belief update concerns belief revision about a "changing"world.
Note that within the concept of "common belief in future rationality", the condition of "belief in the opponent's rationality"changes as the game proceeds. Namely, if the game reaches a certain point X, then the relevant condition is that the player at X believes that his opponents will choose rationally from X onwards. Clearly, this condition depends on X, and hence it changes during the play of the game. In a sense, one could say that a player's "vision of the game" changes during the game within the concept of "common belief in future rationality"as he only looks at the game that lies ahead. For that reason, there is a chance that "common belief in future rationality" can perhaps be captured within a model of belief update à la Katsuno and Mendelzon (1991) . But for the moment this is pure speculation, and we leave this issue for future research.
